Friday, December 27, 2013

John Kerry and the Willingness to Take Risks

If you read political journalism (and I do), 2013 has been a very successful year for Secretary of State John Kerry.  He is credited with restarting moribund Israeli/Palestinian peace talks, orchestrating a potential breakthrough with Iran on its efforts to pursue nuclear weapons, and reached an accord to destroy Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons.

I am cautiously optimistic.  U.S. policy makers have been trying to untie the Gordian Knot of Israel and Palestine for decades.  Netanyahu  does not strike me a peace maker even if a deal is in the best interest of Israel.  On Iran, there is a real chance to change the calculus in the broader Middle East.  Iran as something other than belligerent could alter the trajectory of American foreign policy in the region from what it has been for the past 30 years.  However, I have my doubts that the power structure in Iran is willing to pursue some form of true reconciliation. Most significant to me is the elimination of the chemical weapons in Syria.  Unfortunately, this success will probably be overshadowed by the continued Syrian civil war.  As a result, a true achievement will be forgotten in the shadow of this conflict.

As interesting as the substance (or lack thereof) of Kerry's accomplishments, what interests me more is the discussion of Kerry's willingness to gamble on peace initiatives.  The prevailing narrative is that Kerry has no further political ambitions and thus can try and fail at diplomatic initiatives (unlike his predecessor, Hillary Clinton who may well seek the presidency).  Maybe this narrative is correct.  If so, I am troubled by it.  Is U.S. foreign policy really so constrained by a fear of failure?  What counts as failure?

The idea that failing to get Israelis and Palestinians to sit for peace talks constitutes a failure of American foreign policy is ridiculous.  It might be a sign over our lack of influence over the parties but I cannot view it as a failure.  To me, the U.S. should simply be advocating for a peaceful resolution of the dispute at all times, not engaging in occasional efforts to restart the process.  If Israelis and Palestinians can not or will not reach agreement, that is not evidence that America has failed.  America fails only when it fails to keep pushing the parties toward a solution.  Similarly, the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program.  Failure is not failing to come to an agreement on Iran's nuclear program.  Failure is armed conflict over Iran's nuclear program.  The U.S. should be pushing Iran to reach an accord on its ability to build nuclear weapons, via sanctions and diplomacy.  Because an accord has yet to be reached is not evidence of failure. 

Perhaps we need to think more carefully about what diplomatic failure looks like.  America's foreign policy goals are moving targets.  Trying to reach those goals through diplomatic means is progress even if the U.S. fails to get all it wants.  Perhaps the problem is that foreign policy is being viewed through a more political lens by the media resulting in a winners and losers narrative.  To me, foreign policy is a long game.  To win that game requires persistence as well as a willingness to take risks.  Hopefully Kerry will tune out this win/loss narrative and continue to gamble on the possibility of a better world.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Rising Power

The United States Senate conducted hearings for President Obama's nominee for the United States Ambassador to the United Nations today.  That nominee, Samantha Power, is one of the more interesting figures to rise to a level of power in the foreign policy apparatus in years.  She also happens to be one of those people that foreign policy nerds like me fantasize about having having stop by for cocktail hour to have length policy debates with about obscure parts of the globe.

Power made her mark in a very different way then most foreign policy hands.  She started as a journalist.  If memory serves me right, she started covering baseball.  Images of the war in the former Yugoslavia prompted her to take a job as a freelance reporter in Bosnia.  This, in turn, resulted in Power having a front-row seat for a modern genocide.  Power later wrote a Pulitzer Prize winning book A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide based, in part, on this experience.

A Problem from Hell is an excellent book.  While the book does a fine job on educating the reader about genocide and debunking the myth that policy makers lacked an understanding of what was happening when confronted with instances of genocide, what stuck with me from the book was Power's sense of outrage.  Power does a very effective job of distilling the question of whether we (both the public and policy makers) have learned anything from events like the Holocaust.  If we have, how is that we keep allowing genocides to happen?

As good as A Problem from Hell is, Power's second book, a biography of  Sergio Vieira de Mello is even better. Vieira de Mello was a diplomat with the United Nations who had a reputation for trouble-shooting, especially in areas of failed states.  He was killed in 2003 while serving as the U.N. envoy in Iraq.  Power traces his career while noting Vieira de Mello's evolving views on international intervention.  In many ways, I feel like Power herself is trying to work though the justifications and dangers attendant in international interventions by tracing Vieira de Mello's own struggles with the subject. 

The evolution of an academic's views on international intervention would be a lot less interesting except Power's career trajectory took a sharp turn.    Power went to work for then Senator Obama shortly after writing Chasing the Flame.   When Senator Obama became President Obama, Power got a job on the National Security Council.  Now, she is Obama's nominee to replace Susan Rice at the United Nations.

There has been much speculation about Power's role in persuading President Obama to intervene in Libya.  Certainly there are many echoes between Power's writings and the rhetoric employed at the time of the U.S. intervention into Libya.  I am inclined to think that the reports of Gaddafi's troops poised to being a massacre in Benghazi was enough to prompt Power to argue forcefully that President Obama needed to do more than watch a new genocide unfold in Libya. It is my hope that we will get a fuller accounting of the decision making that went into the Libya intervention from both Power and Obama when this administration ends.  In the meantime, Power's story is clearly not done.

It will be very interesting to see someone as passionate as Power wrestling with the inertia of the United Nations and the gamesmanship of international politics.  In fact, Power will have a test case of sorts immediately - the Syrian civil war.  Other than peace in the Middle East, there seems to be no more intractable problem on the international stage than Syria.  Can Power persuade the international community to do something about Syria?  Can anything productive be done via foreign intervention?  Would President Obama agree to some form of intervention on humanitarian grounds?

I don't know.  I would love to hear Power's unvarnished views on the subject.  Even better, perhaps she can read Can Intervention Work? and then stop by to debate the subject with Rory Stewart.  I promise to provide absolute confidentiality (perhaps in exchange for an autograph), a chess board, and cocktails of her and Mr. Stewart's choice.